Abstract -We devise a new quantum key distribution scheme that is more efficient than the BB84 protocol. By pre-announcing basis, Alice and Bob are more likely to use the same basis to prepare and measure the qubits, thus achieves a higher efficiency. The error analysis is revised and its security against any eavesdropping is proven briefly. Furthermore we show that, compared with the LCA scheme, our modification can be applied in more quantum channels.
Introduction. -Quantum cryptography [2] lies at the intersection of quantum mechanics and information theory. It utilizes fundamental theories in quantum mechanics to guarantee the information security. Quantum key distribution(QKD) is an important research direction in quantum cryptography and has attracted many interests recently [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] . The best-known QKD scheme is the BB84 protocol [1] which was suggested by Bennett and Brassard in 1984 . In their scheme, Alice and Bob randomly choose Z-basis {|0 , |1 } or X-basis {|+ , |− } to prepare and measure the qubits. If the error rate is small enough, they perform error correction and privacy amplification to get the final key. Otherwise, they terminate the protocol. This protocol has been theoretically proven secure [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] . In practice, many experimental even commercial systems based on BB84 have been proposed [3] , most of which use photon(or weak light pulse) as qubit. An inherent defect of such systems is that photons are easy to be absorbed by the channel. For example, through 100km optical fiber, the absorption is about 20dB, which means that only one percent of the photons will reach the receiver and all the others are lost in the channel. The arrived qubits are so rare that they should not be wasted. In BB84 scheme, Alice and Bob are using different basis with half of the probability in which case the qubits must be discarded. In other word, half of the arrived qubits are wasted. Lo, Chau and Ardehali suggested a more efficient scheme(called LCA) [14] in which the qubits are prepared in Z-basis with probability p or in X-basis with probabil-(a) Email: gaojl0518@gmail.com ity 1 − p. By increasing p, Alice and Bob are more likely to use the same basis, so the fraction of discarded data is reduced and the efficiency is improved. To ensure the security, they employed a refined data analysis. The error rates in Z-basis and X-basis are estimated separately. The run is acceptable if both of the error rates, e Z and e X , are smaller than the tolerance e max .
However, we note that, the security requirement of LCA is so stringent that the BB84 can produce key through some quantum channels but the LCA cannot. For instance, suppose the channel causes 15% errors in the Z-basis, 5% errors in the X-basis, i.e. e Z = 15%, e X = 5%. We set e max = 11%. According to Shor and Preskill's proof [19] , the BB84 protocol is secure if e bit , e phase < e max , where e bit is the bit-flip error rate and e phase is the phase error rate in the corresponding EPP. It should be emphasized that e bit , e phase are not the same with e Z , e X . A confusion often happens here. In the EPP, Alice and Bob apply Hadamard gate on half of the qubits. For the qubits which are not Hadamard transformed, the bit-flip error rate is simply the Z-basis error rate and the phase error rate is the X-basis error rate, i.e. e bit = e Z , e phase = e X . Conversely, for the case that the Hadamard gate is applied, the bit-flip error rate is the Xbasis error rate, and phase error rate is the Z-basis error rate, i.e. e bit = e X , e phase = e Z . The whole bit-flip and phase error rates should be the average of the two cases, i.e. e bit = e phase = (e Z + e X )/2 = 10% < 11%. Thus for BB84, the run is acceptable and the key can be generated. For the LCA, since e Z = 15% > 11%, the run is termip-1 nated and no key is produced. From this example, we can see that the applicability of the LCA scheme is worse than the standard BB84.
The motivation of this paper is to explore an efficient QKD scheme which still works when the LCA is invalid. In the BB84 protocol, Alice and Bob choose the basis randomly, uniformly and independently. The LCA scheme removes the uniformity to get a gain in efficiency. Instead, our new scheme weakens the independency. Suppose Alice encodes the qubit in the basis b. Before sending the qubit, she pre-announces a basis s. The two bases, b and s, coincide with high probability and differ with small probability. Bob performs measurement in the basis preannounced, then they are more likely to be using the same basis, thus the discarded data is reduced and the efficiency is improved. We also revise the error analysis to ensure the security. The details will be explained below. Another advantage of our modification lies in its simplicity. It doesn't need entanglement or any other auxiliaries and it can be applied in many practical QKD systems with only a little software changes. So we think it will attract some practical interests.
This paper is organized as following: The complete procedures of the new scheme are presented in the next section. And then the security of the scheme will be proven rigorously. At the end, the comparison between LCA and our scheme will be shown. (6) Bob tells Alice which qubits are selected for error checking. They share everything about these qubits. (7) They discard the checking qubits where they did not use the same basis, and divide the remaining into two groups-those for which the corresponding c is 0 and those for which c is 1. Then they estimate the error rate of each group, and denote them by e c=0 , e c=1 . If both of e c=0 and e c=1 are smaller than the tolerance e max , they proceed to the next step, otherwise they abort the protocol. (8) Alice announces c of the remaining qubits. They keep the bits where c = 0 as the raw key.
(9) They perform reconciliation and privacy amplification to obtain the final key. Remark: For the error checking qubits, the measuring basis must be chosen independently, not by s.
The first major ingredient of our modification is preannouncing basis. The string b indicates the basis that Alice encodes the qubits. The string s is what she will pre-announced. The string c decides whether s coincides with b or not. Alice pre-announces the string s before sending qubits. Bob chooses basis according to s, then they are using the same basis with probability p. As p rises, the efficiency increases. Clearly, if p > 1 2 , the efficiency is higher than BB84. The second major ingredient is the revised error analysis. The qubits are divided into two subsets according to c, and the error rates of each subset are estimated separately. If both of the error rates are smaller than the tolerance, the run is acceptable, otherwise the protocol terminates. It should be emphasized that for the checking qubits, Bob must choose the basis independently but not according to s. Otherwise, the error rates cannot be estimated correctly. In the following section, we will show that such an error checking strategy guarantees the security of the protocol.
The proof of security. -Proving the security of a QKD scheme turns out to be a very tricky business [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] . Shor and Preskill suggested a simple proof of BB84 in 2000 [19] . They first showed that the BB84 protocol is equivalent to the entanglement-purification protocol(EPP) in the sense of security. Then since the EPP is secure, so is BB84. In this paper, the same skill is employed. First, the underlying EPP protocol which is equivalent to our new modification will be given. Then we will show that the revised error analysis can guarantee the security of the EPP. Since the equivalence, our modification is secure as well.
We now give the complete procedures of underlying EPP protocol: (1) Alice creates EPR pairs in the state |β 00 = (|00 + |11 ) / √ 2. Efficient QKD pre-announcing basis checking data into two groups according to c and estimate the error rates e c=0 , e c=1 separately. If both of e c=0 and e c=1 are smaller than e max , they proceed to the next step, otherwise they abort the protocol. (9) Alice and Bob measure their remaining qubits according to the check matrix for a pre-determined CSS code with error tolerance e max . They share the results, compute the syndromes for the errors, and then correct their state, obtaining nearly perfect EPR pairs. (10) Alice and Bob measure the EPR pairs in the Z-basis to obtain the final key.
This protocol can be reduced to a QECC protocol and then to our new scheme using the skill developed by Shor and Preskill. The details of the reductions can be found in Ref [19] [20] [21] . Here we just claim its truth and prove the security of the EPP directly.
In the EPP, the purifying procedure in step (9) will be done when the criterion e c=0 , e c=1 < e max satisfies. If the EPR pairs can be purified reliably, the fidelity will be very high. By Holevo's bound [22] , high fidelity implies low information that can be tapped [17] . Therefore, to prove the security of the EPP, we just need to show that the purification is reliable. Furthermore, since the purification is based on the CSS code [23, 24] , it runs correctly only when the bit-flip and phase error rates are both smaller than the error tolerance e max . So in summary, we need to prove that: if e c=0 , e c=1 < e max , then e bit , e phase < e max .
Let e s=0 Z be the Z-basis error rate of the qubits where Alice pre-announces s = 0, similarly we can define e s=1 Z , e s=0 X and e s=0 X . In the EPP, for the qubits which are not Hadamard transformed(b=0), the bit-flip error rate is simply the Zbasis error rate, the phase error rate is the X-basis error rate. Thus
(1)
For the qubits where the Hadamard gates are applied(b=1), the bit-flip error rate is the X-basis error rate, the phase error rate is the Z-basis error rate. Thus
Since half of the qubits are Hadamard transformed, we have:
e c=0 consists of two parts: the Z-basis error rate as s=0 and the X-basis error rate as s=1. Hence e c=0 should be the average of the two cases, i.e. e c=1 can be given by the weighted average of the X-basis error rate as s=0 and the Z-basis error rate as s=1, i.e.
From Eqs. (1)- (8), we find that
e phase = (1 − p)e c=0 + pe c=1 .
Consequently, provided e c=0 , e c=1 < e max , we have e bit , e phase < e max , which says that, if the error checking criterion is satisfied, the purification will be reliable. Then the EPP is secure, and so is our scheme. This completes the proof.
Comparison with LCA. -The comparison between LCA and our scheme is a bit confusing because they seems equivalent. However, we will show that: Through some quantum channels, the LCA is unable to generate key but our scheme may work. For example, still set e Z = 15%, e X = 5%, e max = 11%. As stated above, the LCA is ineffective in such settings. Instead, our scheme offers the opportunity. If the error rates remain constant no matter what Alice pre-announces, i.e. e s=0 X = e s=1 X = e X = 5%, e s=0 Z = e s=1 Z = e Z = 15%, then from(7)(8), e c=0 = e c=1 = 10% < 11%, so the run is acceptable and the key will be generated from our scheme.
More intuitively, the error tolerances of the two schemes are shown in Fig.1 . Each point in the figure represents a class of quantum channels. For example, the point(0.05, 0.03) indicates the channels with 5% errors in X-basis and 3% errors in Z-basis. More points a protocol covers, more channels it can be applied in.
For the LCA, the security criterion is e Z , e X < 11%, which covers the dot region in Fig.1 .
For our scheme, e X and e Z should be the average of the error rates as s=0 and s=1, i.e.
From Eqs. (7)(8)(11)(12),we obtain e Z + e X = e c=0 + e c=1 .
Let α = e c=1 /e c=0 , then the security criterion e c=0 , e c=1 < e max becomes e Z + e X < min (1 + α)e max , (1
When α = 1, it covers the maximum area, i.e. 1 2 (e X + e Z ) < e max .
which is shown as the slashed region in Fig.1 . Clearly, the coverage of the new scheme is larger than that of LCA. It should be clarified that, whether the new scheme generates key or not, not only depends on e X and e Z , but also depends on the parameter α. From (14) , if α takes other value, e.g. α = 2, the criterion becomes e X + e Z < 3 2 e max , which covers a smaller area than shown in Fig.1 . In this case, the new scheme cannot produce key when e X = 0.05, e Z = 0.15 because e X + e Z = 0.2 > 3 2 e max . So the new scheme is not always effective when LCA is invalid. However, it does provide the possibility. Thus our scheme may be a better choice in practice. The parameter α can be used to estimate how much preannounced information was utilized by Eve. If there is no Eve, α should be 1. If Eve exists and the pre-announced basis is used for eavesdropping, more errors will occur in the part of the qubits where the pre-announced bases are incorrect(where c=1). Then α will be larger than 1. By observing α, Alice and Bob can get some knowledge about Eve's intercepting strategy. In LCA's paper, they declared that their scheme can be further improved by combining it with two-way classical communication. Luckily, our scheme also benefits from the same extension. It was shown in [25] that the e max can be increased up to 18.9% if the two-way classical communication is applied. Combining with this result, the best coverage (when α = 1) of our scheme is expanded to e X + e Z < 37.8%.
Conclusion. -In this paper, we suggest a new QKD scheme. By pre-announcing a batch of bases, Alice and Bob use the same basis with high probability, thus achieve a high efficiency. We revise the error checking criterion and prove its security. We also compared our scheme with the LCA scheme and show that our scheme may be a better choice in some quantum channels. * * * This work is supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China Grant No.61271174.
